This paper investigates the speed of institutional development induced by European integration. The hypotheses are the following. The prospect for European countries to join the EU disposes them to strengthen their institutions, so that the speed of institutional development is high. Furthermore, EU Member States preparing for the introduction of the euro have incentives to develop their institutions, but the speed of institutional development is much lower. As soon as Member States introduce the euro, institutional development grinds to a halt, or is even reversed, as there could be incentives to undo reforms. To test these hypotheses, we estimate a dynamic panel data model, in which the institutional development is measured as positive changes in Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs).
Introduction
It is widely recognized that the institutional development and transformation process in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe paved the way for the considerable and ongoing enlargement of the European Union (EU). Furthermore, the prospect for European countries to join the EU creates additional incentives for them to strengthen their institutions, and the EU serves as an "outside anchor" for the reform process (Berglöf, Roland 1997, p. 2) . On the one hand, conditionality on the EU accession (Copenhagen criteria) is an obstacle candidate countries have to overcome. On the other hand, it provides the transition countries' governments with guidelines for reforms. The adoption of the euro does not have direct legal effects on institutional development, but it can have economic implications on it.
Liikanen (2005, p. 60) argues that the Maastricht criteria will foster future institutional reforms, not just those explicitly required in the Maastricht criteria.
One aim of this paper is to assess empirically whether the prospect for European countries to join the EU disposes them to strengthen their institutions. Certainly, one would expect a positive impact of this prospect. The more challenging question concerns what happens to the institutional development after the country has become a Member State of the EU preparing for the introduction of the euro and finally a member of the euro area.
Some empirical literature exists on the link between prospective EU membership and institutional development in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In a cross-section, Beck and Laeven (2006) identify a positive link between the EU accession and the Worldwide Governance Indicators, although they do not control for reverse causality. Di Tommaso et al. (2007) examine the determinants of institutional change using a panel data set comprising 25 transition economies. Their approach is to treat institutional change as a multidimensional unobserved variable. The results suggest that an external anchor, such as EU accession, can break the path dependence of institutional change to some extent. Using a Hausman-Taylor model for a panel data set of 25 transition countries, Schweickert et al.
(2011) identify a positive link between the pre-accession incentives provided by the EU and NATO and institutional development. Building on a theoretical model that explains how the prospective EU membership drives regulation in applicant countries beyond their equilibrium level of regulatory quality, Mattli and Plümper (2004) estimate that the EU application accounts for approx. 40% of the variance of regulatory quality in transition countries.
Regulatory quality is measured by the average of the nine European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition indicators. Moreover, Mattli and Plümper (2004) provide evidence that exogenous changes in the perceived likelihood of EU accession have an impact on the pace of reforms. Countries with the prospect of late accession reform significantly less than their early accession counterparts. Brücker et al. (2005) test whether accession candidate countries have a lower long-term labour to output ratio and adjust labour productivity faster to its long-run levels than other transition countries. This is an indication for the hardening of soft budget constraints (SBC), which the EU accession can foster according to their model. Indeed, they find that in accession candidate countries the speed of adjustment is significantly larger and labour productivity is significantly higher. The only paper that finds no significant effect of prospective EU membership on development of economic institutions is that of Staehr (2011) . He estimates the impact of EU enlargement on political and economic reforms in former socialist countries from 1989 to 2008. A set of dummy variable captures the progress of each transition country in the EU enlargement process; political reforms comprise political rights and civil liberties, and the EBRD transition indicators capture economic reforms. While prospective and actual membership have positive effects on political reforms, the effect on economic reforms is insignificant or even negative. However, as political freedom explains much of the progress in economic reforms, and political reforms are in turn influenced by the actual and prospective EU membership, economic reforms are indirectly determined by the EU enlargement process, rather than directly.
Two strands of literature analyse the impact of the euro area membership. The first focuses on reforms in the regulation of product and labour markets. The second examines the influence on fiscal deficits. For example, Alesina et al. (2010) show that the euro accelerated reforms in the product markets and seems to have been accompanied by wage moderation in the labour market. Duval and Elmeskov (2005) , Belke et al. (2007) and Belke and Vogel (2012) also contribute to this strand of literature. Investigating the modes of organization of the budget process in ten Central and Eastern European countries, Gleich (2003) detects a relationship between institutional settings and fiscal performance. He shows that procedures that contribute to reducing collective action problems have been associated with more fiscal discipline. Hence, progress in the institutional structure of the budgeting process can facilitate the compliance with the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. Bayar and Smeets (2009) and Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2007) also found a positive effect of the Maastricht Treaty on fiscal balance. In contrast, Galli and Padovano (2008) and Mink and Haan (2005) do not find support for this thesis. Eijffinger and Stadhouders (2003) examine the relationship between inflation, the institutional design of monetary institutions and the rule of law. They argue that legal arrangements are a necessary condition for central bank independence, but the actual application of law is much more important to achieve price stability. Institutional quality indicators are used as a proxy for the rule of law, and they are shown to be significantly and negatively related to the inflation rate.
However, to our knowledge, there is empirical literature on neither the link between EU membership with preparation to introduce the euro and institutional development nor the relationship between current euro area membership and institutional development. The only evidence is provided by a case study by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013) , which shows that economic reforms were abandoned and institutions deteriorated after the introduction of the euro in Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The aim of our paper is to shed light on these relationships.
In this paper, the term "institutions" is defined broadly and we do not explore specific policy measures or institutional arrangements. To measure institutional development, we employ the six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) of Kaufmann et al. (2010) : Voice and
Stability and Absence of Violence (PSNV), Rule of Law (RoL) and Regulatory Quality (RQ).
Institutional development is measured as positive changes in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs). This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the theoretical considerations why we care about institutional development, and how the European integration matters for institutional development. Section 3 describes our empirical model and the estimation method. The data on institutional development and the countries' status is explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents and discusses our result and Section 6 provides various robustness checks. To sum up our findings, we can confirm a positive effect of prospective EU membership for most WGIs and econometric specifications. In particular, prospective EU membership reduces the persistence of institutional development. Being a Member State does not influence the institutional development path. However, there is robust evidence for the deterioration of control of corruption for members of the euro area.
The last section contains the conclusion.
Theoretical framework
Three central questions shape our theoretical framework. First, does institutional development matter? Second, does the EU influence institutional development, and which role does the EU conditionality play in the accession process? Third, does the membership in the euro area matter for institutional development?
In the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union committed to "promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable" (European Union 29/07/1992, Common Provisions, Article B). Among others, catching up in the institutional development of Member
States could contribute to long-term income convergence in the EU and the euro area.
Roland (2000, p. XIX) emphasizes the importance of adequate institutions for economic growth in transition countries: the experience of transition from socialism to capitalism in former socialist economies shows that the structural policies of liberalization, stabilization and privatization should be accompanied by adequate institutions to deliver successful outcomes. According to the development and growth literature, there is a positive link between the institutional development of a country and its development stage and income growth, respectively. Since the contributions by North (1981 North ( , 1990 ), many attempts have been made to verify this hypothesis empirically (see for example Beck and Laeven (2006) and references therein). Here, we discuss two empirical papers, which particularly shape our selection of control variables. Dollar and Kraay (2003) investigate the partial effects of institutions and trade on GDP growth in a panel of around 100 countries and decadal growth rates in the 1990s, 1980s and 1970s. Using a two-stage least-squares estimation (2SLS) in first differences and lagged explanatory variables as instruments, they find a substantial partial effect of changes in trade on changes in GDP growth. Moreover, changes in the measures of institutions have a positive but smaller effect. Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) estimate the interrelationships between rule of law, democracy, openness and income. In a cross section, they use differences in the variances of error terms across sub-samples of the data to identify the coefficients of the four endogenous variables. This strategy is called identification through heteroscedasticity (IH) and is an alternative to the instrumental variable approach. They find that democracy and law of rule influence income positively and that the rule of law has a stronger impact on income than democracy. However, the reverse is also likely to be true. They find some indication that higher income produces better institutions (i.e. rule of law and democracy). Regarding openness, their results are striking, as they find an asymmetric effect of openness on economic and political institutions. Openness improves the indicator rule of law, but worsens democracy, although the former effect is not significant in every specification. Even if institutional development is socially desirable in a country, reforms may be not implemented because of problems covered by the public choice theory.
These could be, for example, strategic decisions of self-interested politicians and national or international distributional conflicts (see for example Drazen 2000) .
The second question is related to the literature on the EU as an external or outside anchor and EU conditionality. Crombrugghe et al. (1996) outline the motivation for fast integration of transition countries into the EU based on self-fulfilling expectations. The transition country's expectation of EU entry can coordinate the expectations towards a fast-growth, catching-up equilibrium. The premise is that both the transition countries and the EU transparently and strongly commit to reforms and enlargement, respectively. This would accelerate investments and growth in the transition countries and attract foreign direct investment. This can be shown in a model of self-fulfilling rational expectations based on Krugman (1991) , which Crombrugghe et al. (1996, pp. 2, 16-17) apply to EU enlargement. Reforms that strengthen the flexibility of an economy or an exogenous boom, for example, in foreign direct investment can boost the economy. However, to achieve enduring high economic growth rates, the co-ordination of the positive expectations of investors is important if there are external economies (i.e. positive externalities). If the reforms are expected to be credible, growth-promoting actions of investors (i.e. investment, sectoral reallocation, political support for reforms) are more likely. The credibility of a reform is taken for granted when investors expect the reform to be permanent and if each investor believes that other investors will also expect it to be permanent. Hence, whether the promised growth effects of reforms occur also depends on the public's expectations about the future (Crombrugghe et al. 1996, p. 2) . A strong commitment to enlargement and transparent conditionality can coordinate these expectations towards a catching-up equilibrium. Roland and Verdier (2003) develop a model to analyse law enforcement problems in transition economies with coordination problems and multiple equilibria. They show that accession to the EU provides a mechanism to overcome a "bad" equilibrium if the "accessing" country is small enough relative to the EU. Mattli and Plümper (2004) The role of EU conditionality in the accession process can be discussed separately from a normative and a positive point of view, i.e. how the EU conditionality should be shaped and how it was in fact applied. The principle of conditionality requires that clear and equal accession conditions apply to all countries, their progress is evaluated coherently and without discrimination by the EU and their status of accession is directly dependent upon these evaluations (Kochenov 2008, p. 299) . European Union conditionality, if designed and conducted properly, has several positive effects (Crombrugghe et al. 1996, p. 9) . First, it provides the transition countries' governments with guidelines for reforms. Second, it introduces competition between political parties in a transition country for the best reforms to meet the conditions if the public regards the EU membership as desirable. Third, it enables the transition countries to make a sovereign decision on whether it is worth entering the EU based on a cost-benefit analysis. Weber (1995) (Weber 1995, pp. 198-203 the Western Balkan countries. Weber shows that the conditionality was not a paper tiger in the early 1990s. In several countries, the programmes were suspended or delayed in response to non-compliance (Weber 1995, pp. 198-203) .
For the conditionality principle to work, the EU moved away from a deeply politicized practice of enlargement regulation to an increasingly legal enlargement regulation in the 1990s (Kochenov 2008, p. 297) . The Copenhagen European Council formulated accession criteria in 1993:
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. (European Council 22/06/1993, 7.A.iii)) These criteria are called the "Copenhagen criteria" and they were implemented by the Copenhagen-related documents in the course of the recent enlargements. In a jurisprudential analysis of the EU conditionality on the new CEE Member States, Kochenov (2008) shows that the EU successfully formed a framework of instruments for the application of the conditionality principle regarding the criteria "democracy" and "rule of law". However, he concludes that the application of the instruments was a "resounding failure, if it was applied at all" (Kochenov 2008, p. 300) , at least in the areas of democracy and rule of law. A country's status towards accession was not linked to the Commission's evaluation, so that the conditionality principle was de facto removed in the areas of democracy and rule of law (Kochenov 2008, pp. 300-301) .
The third question concerns the influence of euro area membership on institutional development. Alesina et al. (2010) lay down some economic arguments why the membership in the euro area could accelerate and facilitate deregulation in product markets and liberalization and deregulation in labour markets. They describe two channels by which the euro could foster reforms: the competition channel and the adjustment channel. The former establishes a relationship between more competition due to the single market and the cost of regulation. If one agrees upon that a common currency is a necessary condition for having a truly common market, than the protection of insider firms and workers by anti-competitive regulation would become more costly and visible to consumers and voters. The second channel becomes relevant, whenever a country is losing competitiveness. The common currency eliminates the possibility of strategic devaluations, when the real wage growth is out of line with productivity growth. Hence, adjustment has to come by real wage adjustment and labour mobility and flexibility (Alesina et al. 2010, p. 2) . This argument is related to the TINA (There Is No Alternative) argument. By introducing the euro, the member countries become unable to use monetary policy to accommodate asymmetric shocks. Instead, adjustment has to come via a boom or recession. This will be less painful in terms of unemployment, the more flexible the labour market is. Therefore, euro area members have to develop marketbased adjustment channels to adjust to shocks (Bean 1998, p. 368; Alesina et al. 2010, p. 6 ).
On the other side, some economists argue that the euro could hamper the labour market reforms. Reforms on the supply side entail negative short-term effects on employment.
These can be alleviated by expansionary aggregate demand policies. In the euro area, member countries are constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact in pursuing fiscal policy, and they are unable to conduct monetary policy. Hence, the short-term costs of labour market reforms are higher in a common currency area and reforms may become politically unfeasible (Bean 1998, p. 377; Alesina et al. 2010, p. 7) . Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2001) argue that this applies for big changes in labour market institutions, rather than small reforms. They show that large-scale labour market reforms will be harder to implement, whereas some gradual reforms towards flexibility are easier to implement within the euro area. Berglöf et al. (2008; present a model where a member of a club, say of the EU, has incentives to reform beyond his privately optimal level. This model can also show under which conditions a club-in-club, for example the euro area, emerges and why even weak members of the outer club (EU) reform to meet the accession criteria of the inner club (euro area). The more heterogeneous the members of the organization are the more likely is the formation of an inner club. The imminent negative externality on the members of the outer organization is the driver for more effort. In this spirit, the creation of a common currency area with strict criteria for joining (Maastricht criteria) is a "club-in-club" that remains open to every country willing to reform, and therefore joining the euro area (Berglöf et al. 2012, pp. 501-502) .
In a case study, Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013) show that economic reforms were abandoned and institutions deteriorated after the introduction of the euro in Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. They argue that as the euro facilitated large inflows of capital, which enabled the emergence of the financial bubble in peripheral countries, economic reforms were abandoned, institutions deteriorated and the response to the credit bubble was delayed. This hampered the growth prospects of these countries. Fernández-Villaverde et al.
(2013) analyse two channels to explain this development, which contrasted strongly with the German case. First, capital flows relaxed the economic constraints under which agents (e.g. a government, bank manager) were acting, which reduced the pressure for reforms. Second, capital inflows hindered the principal (e.g. voters, shareholders, investors) in extracting signals about the performance of the agent. Germany did not experience a loosening of its financing conditions because of the introduction of the euro, and it was faced with a stagnant economy. Hence, Germany implemented far-reaching structural reforms, so that the divergence in institutions between Germany and the other peripheral countries increased after the introduction of the euro (Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2013, pp. 146-147) .
To sum up the literature, there could be indirect effects of the Maastricht criteria on institutional reforms. As soon as Member States introduce the euro, there are virtually no effective enforcement measures, so the incentives to undertake institutional reforms may disappear. However, the conclusions of the theoretical models on this question are ambiguous.
Econometric model and estimation method
In our empirical analysis, we are interested in revealing the speed of institutional development induced by European integration. The hypotheses are the following. The prospect for European countries to join the EU disposes them to strengthen their institutions, so that the speed of institutional development is high. Furthermore, EU Member States preparing for the introduction of the euro have incentives to develop their institutions, but the speed of institutional development is much lower. As soon as Member States introduce the euro, institutional development grinds to a halt, or is even reversed, as there could be incentives to undo reforms. Of course, it is difficult to measure incentives directly. In fact, we can only capture actual outcomes, i.e. the values of the indicators for institutional development.
It must be pointed out that the status of a country may affect its institutional development with a time lag rather than instantaneously since it usually takes some time to implement institutional reforms. Beyond that, one can suppose a level effect of the institutional development. Leaving the other variables constant, a country that is highly institutionally developed will probably face more difficulties in developing its institutions further at the same pace as a less institutionally developed country. Moreover, the marginal effect of the status on the change in the WGIs may depend on the level of the WGIs. Therefore, we introduce interaction terms between the status variables and the lagged-level WGIs. 1 This also allows for different slopes for the level effect of the WGIs depending on the status. The issue of potential endogeneity of regressors is highly relevant to our analysis. If one regressor is correlated with the error term, the least-squares estimates of the coefficients are inconsistent. This is called the simultaneous equation bias (see for example Greene 2000, pp. 652-662; Cameron, Trivedi 2007, pp. 90-95 and Baltagi 2008, pp. 121-129) . We hypothesize an influence of a European country's status on the change in WGIs. However, the reverse is also likely to be true. As potential candidate, candidate and acceding countries improve their institutions, they are rewarded with a higher status. This corresponds to the conditionality principle discussed in Section 2 that a country's status towards accession shall be linked to its institutional development. It is reasonable to assume a delay of the "reward"
for at least one period, as the evaluation by the Commission and the political decision process take some time. Hence, the status variable in equation (1) is probably weakly exogenous or predetermined.
As for the status variable, reverse causality may also apply to the control variables GDP per capita and openness. The growth and development literature, which tries to identify the effect of good institutions on economic development, struggles with the interrelationship between these variables (see the discussion in Section 2). Hence, one has to ensure that the control variables do not correlate with the error term.
According to our considerations, we form the following estimation equation:
(1) 
This rearrangement clarifies that we are interested in explaining the speed of institutional development, i.e. the expected year-to-year changes in the WGIs. All the coefficients are identical but the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable becomes less intuitive to interpret. Therefore, we estimate equation (1) 
The WGIs are supposed to be state-dependent. Hence, the coefficient 1  is between 0 and 1. For potential candidate countries (PCEU = 1), the conditional expectation of equation (1) is (4) , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 
coefficient on PCEU or its interaction term is not zero. To test for significance, one simply has to perform a F-test on the null-hypothesis that 2
The equation (1) is estimated for each one of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators with two-way fixed effects OLS. 7 The fixed-effects estimator is generally biased in dynamic models. This is known as the Nickell bias (Nickell 1981) . However, as T gets large, the fixed effects estimator becomes consistent (Baltagi 2008, p. 147) . The sample period is sufficiently large that the bias should not be large in this estimation. The alternative estimators that are usually used in the dynamic panel data context are the Anderson-Hsiao estimator and the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedures, such as the Arellano-Bond estimator, Arellano-Bover estimator and Blundell-Bond estimator, yet they are particularly suited to short panels with T fixed and N  (Cameron, Trivedi 2007, p. 744 ). Short panels comprise few periods but many individuals (usually several hundreds of people or firms), whereas long panels comprise many time periods with relatively few individuals (for example countries) so that inference can be based on the assumption that T   (Cameron, Trivedi 2007, pp. 721-723 Bundesbank (2012, pp. 23-25) for an empirical application to a similar sample as well as Alesina et al. (2010) , both of which apply a fixed-effects estimator. 9 For a detailed description of the WGI methodology, see Kaufmann et al. (2010) .
bodies. The variables are clustered along the six dimensions of governance by an unobserved components model. By following this method, it is possible to construct margins of error, which indicate the underlying uncertainty, and assign weights according to the informative signal of the source (Kaufmann et al. 2010, pp. 5-11) . The WGIs are normally distributed, with zero mean and ranging approximately from -2.5 to 2.5. Table 1 describes the six dimensions of the WGIs. Capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. Government Effectiveness (GE)
Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Regulatory Quality (RQ)
Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rule of Law (RoL) Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of Corruption (CoC)
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2010, p. 4) The indicators cover the years 1996-2012 and are available on a two-year basis until 2002 and on a yearly basis subsequently. Hence, we have to handle the missing data problem for the WGIs in 1997 WGIs in , 1999 WGIs in and 2001 . Since the lack of these WGIs depends neither on their value nor on the values of other variables in the dataset, they are missing completely at random (for a discussion of missing data assumptions and their consequences, see Cameron, Trivedi 2007, pp. 923-941) .
There are two simple ways to handle missing data in this case: listwise deletion 11 and mean imputation. The former has several disadvantages. Since 3 out of 17 observations (time dimension) are missing, deletion leads to a substantial reduction in the total number of observations. Even more information is lost if we calculate the year-to-year changes in the 10 The field of economic governance analyses the "performance of different institutions under different conditions, the evolution of these institutions, and the transitions from one set of institutions to another" (Dixit 2008) . Important measures of institutional quality are the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs). 11 Listwise deletion means reducing the sample to complete observations (Cameron, Trivedi 2007, p. 925 There are several potential problems with the WGIs to discuss as we use the cross-section and time dimension in our analysis. 12 As the WGIs are constructed to have a zero mean in each period, comparisons of WGIs over time could be a problem. Kaufmann et al. (2007, pp. 3-4) argue that this could indeed be problematic for absolute changes in the WGIs. (Kaufmann et al. 2007, pp. 3-4) . A further point of criticism is that the WGIs might be too imprecise to yield sensible comparisons over time or countries. This criticism could be applied to every governance indicator because of measurement errors. However, the WGIs aggregate the existing indicators and hence their information about governance. Above that, margins of errors are computed, which allows the testing for significance in differences (Kaufmann et al. 2007, pp. 10-11) .
Status dummy variables
To indicate the status or official relationship of the countries of our sample with the EU and the euro area, we construct a set of dummy variables. The sample covers 56 countries, among which are 33 European countries, which have been at least a potential candidate at some point in time (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) according to the classification in The notation and classification of a country's status are based on the official specifications of the European Union and the European Central Bank. However, they are not identical in the case of Sweden and the potential candidates. Originally, the EU named countries involved in the stabilization and association process in the Western Balkans potential candidates, which
are not yet official candidate countries (European Commission 2012). We extend this term to all the countries involved in a pre-accession strategy of the EU according to the definition in We first present some descriptive statistics and perform a graphical analysis. The WGI summary statistics of our sample are reported in Table 3 . The mean of the WGIs of our sample is above zero (0.32-0.60) and the median ranges from Now we turn to the estimates of equation (1). Table 6 shows the results of six regressions; in each regression, one governance indicator is the dependent variable. The regressions are estimated by two-way within OLS. Panel robust standard errors allowing for heteroscedasticity across countries and serial correlation are reported. (Kam, Franzese 2005, p. 13; Brambor et al. 2006, p. 72) . The first case allows for different intercepts and slopes for the level effect of the WGIs depending on the status. Table 6 shows that the WGIs are state-dependent for all six dimensions. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables are within a range of 0.70 to 0.82 and highly significant. The coefficients of the status dummy variables are mostly positive, with a few exceptions, which corresponds to an upward intercept shift of the regression line (we call it the direct effect). The prospect for joining the EU has significant direct effects on the indicators VaA, GE and RQ: being a CCEU speeds up the development of GE, and being an ACEU contributes positively to VaA.
Potential candidate countries and acceding countries experience an improvement in RQ.
There are no significant direct effects for CCEA. For the indicator CoC, the coefficient of MBEA is negative and significant at the 5% level. Thus, there seems to be a direct negative effect of being a euro area country on CoC.
Candidate and acceding countries experience a significant reduction in institutional persistence for almost all the WGIs (which we call the indirect effect of the status). The coefficients of the interaction terms are negative and significant. For GE, the institutional persistence also decreases in potential candidate countries (for CoC and RoL, the significance is at the 10% level). In contrast, Member States preparing for the introduction of the euro and euro area countries hardly experience a significant influence on their institutional development path. The marginal effects of 1 t WGI  on t WGI depending on the status are shown in Table 8 . The institutional persistence is the lowest for candidate and acceding countries. In Table 6 , we see that the control variable GDP per capita is positive and significant for most of the indicators, as expected. Trade is positive and significant for RoL and RQ at the 5% level and for PSNV at the 10% level. Figure 4 , one can see that the effect of becoming a potential candidate country is statistically significant at conventional levels for relatively low institutionally developed countries (with government effectiveness below approx. -0.4). In contrast, there is no statistically significant effect for institutionally high-developed countries. It is useful to complement the insights of Table 6 and Figure 4 with a quantitative assessment of the impact of being a potential candidate country on the government effectiveness. Let us assume that Albania, whose government effectiveness indicator scored -0.80 in 1996, would have been a potential candidate in 1996. This would have raised Albania's indicator score by 0.09 in 1997 holding other variables constant. Once the GE scores more than -0.4, the effect of being a potential candidate on GE is not statistically significant different from zero any more.
Over all WGIs, a quite homogenous picture emerges. Being a PCEU has a significant and positive effect on the improvement of four WGIs when the institutional development level is low (below world average). The same applies to CCEU for slightly other WGIs, but the marginal effect is as twice as large. For most WGIs, the effect is even greater when a country is an acceding country to the EU. However, the standard errors are also considerably larger for ACEU. Moreover, potential candidates, candidates and acceding countries with relatively low developed institutions benefit the most from the EU accession process. In contrast, high institutionally developed potential candidates, candidates and acceding countries do not experience any significant improvement of their institutions because of the EU accession.
To better judge the substantive implication of the results, we provide boxplots of the sample for all WGIs (Figure 8 To conclude, there is evidence that potential candidate, candidate and acceding countries perform better than the control group. In particular, prospective EU membership reduces the persistence of institutional development. There are virtually no differences in the 13 These countries are Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Estonia.
performance of Member States preparing to adopt the euro, euro area members and the control group NO. The only exception is the negative impact of being an MBEA on CoC. 
Robustness checks
To verify that our results are robust to model and data specifications, we re-estimate equation (1) firstly using biannual data and secondly splitting the sample in two, one part for the issue of EU accession and the other for the issue of the introduction of the euro.
14 Additionally, we estimate equation (1) with biannual data using the Blundell-Bond system GMM. Our previous conclusions are largely confirmed.
The use of biannual data on the entire sample is motivated by the lack of WGIs for the years 1997, 1999 and 2001. As discussed in Section 4.1, mean imputation could have an impact on the distribution of the WGIs and therefore could affect the covariances with other variables. Hence, we drop the information for the years 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 and use biannual data as a robustness check. Due to the small number of observations, we also have to merge the statuses ACEU and CCEU. The estimates and tests are presented in the appendix (Table 13 ). The results are quite similar to those of our main specification. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables are now more strongly downward biased, as one would expect due to the Nickell bias. The prospect for joining the EU has positive direct effects on the speed of institutional development, which is significant for most indicators and particularly for CCEU. Now, even Member States preparing for the introduction of the euro experience positive direct effect on GE and RoL (significant at the 10% level). Again, being a member of the euro area is associated with significant impairment of CoC. With respect to the indirect effect of the status, one can confirm a reduction of persistence related to being a CCEU. This effect is highly significant for all the indicators except one. However, the bias of the coefficients of the endogenous and potentially weak exogenous variables is higher in a biannual setting as the number of periods diminishes to T = 9. It is possible to determine the direction of the bias for the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable but not for the other regressors. Therefore, we prefer to use annual data below.
The second way to confirm robustness is to split the sample into two, one part for the issue of EU accession and the other for the issue of the introduction of the euro. The first sample covers the new Member States, acceding countries, candidate countries, potential candidate countries and other European and Central Asian developing countries as defined by the World Bank (Table 11 ). The statuses CCEA and MBEA are merged into the status "Member State of EU" (MBEU). The estimates and tests are present in the appendix (Table 14) . They confirm the high persistence of the WGIs, which is reduced by the prospect of entering the EU. Even being a Member State (MBEU) reduces the persistence of VaA, CoC and PSNV.
However, there is little evidence of direct effects of status on the WGIs; only a few coefficients are weakly significant. The effect of PCEU on RQ is at least jointly significant.
Concerning the introduction of the euro, the second sample covers all the euro area countries and other OECD countries (Table 12 ). There are just three statuses: NO, CCEA and MBEA. The high persistence of the WGIs is confirmed as well as the negative direct effect of MBEA on CoC. The effect of the status CCEA on CoC is at least jointly significant.
Moreover, being a CCEA increases the persistence of GE, which also applies to MBEA on GE and CoC. Finally, there is some indication that RoL could be more persistent for CCEA.
The use of biannual data reduces the number of observation periods from T = 17 to T = 9, which allows the application of the system GMM estimator as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) . The system GMM estimator is particular suited to short samples, in which the autoregressive parameter is moderately high. Moreover, system GMM allows the estimation of coefficients of time-invariant variables. Even though we do not have time-invariant variables in our specification, the use of the cross-section variation improves the estimation as the status dummy variables vary only a little over time. To avoid the problem of instrument proliferation, we restrict the instrument count as described by Roodman (2009) , first by restricting the lags to be used for instruments instead of using all the available lags and second by "collapsing" the instrument matrix. The estimates, significance and specification tests are reported in Table 16 . The GMM results are very weak for the indicators PSNV and RQ, for which the coefficients of the status variables and the interaction terms are all insignificant. Regarding the membership in the euro area, the negative impact on CoC is again confirmed. The GMM results also show a significant negative impact of being a euro area member on RoL. In contrast, we see a positive influence of being a member of the euro area on the development of VaA. By and large, the GMM results confirm our previous conclusions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the speed and direction of institutional development induced by European integration. We can confirm a positive effect of EU enlargement on institutional development. The positive effect of EU enlargement operates mainly through breaking the path dependence of institutional development. Hence, we can confirm the results of the empirical literature on transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The novel finding of this paper is that once countries have become EU Member States or even introduced the euro, their institutional development loses momentum. The worries that new Member States could quickly reverse their reforms are not supported empirically.
However, we have robust evidence that members of the euro area underperform in one particular area of institutional development, namely control of corruption. Notes: System GMM (Blundell, Bond 1998) with Windmeijer (2005) 
